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Abstract
Under tenancy rent control, rents are regulated within a tenancy but not between tenancies.
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1Tenancy Rent Control and Credible
Commitment in Maintenance
1 Introduction
Tenancy rent control is a form of rent control in which rents are regulated within a tenancy but may
be raised without restriction between tenancies; more speciﬁcally, the starting rent for a tenancy
is unregulated but the path of nominal rents within a tenancy, conditional on the starting rent,
is regulated, typically causing rents to rise less rapidly over the tenancy than they would in the
absence of controls1. Many, perhaps most, jurisdictions around the world that previously had
traditional ﬁrst- and second-generation rent control programs (Arnott, 1995) have moved in the
direction of tenancy rent control as a method of partial decontrol2.
In jurisdictions that have stricter forms of rent control, tenancy rent control may be an attractive
method of partial decontrol. Because the starting rent adjusts to clear the market, tenancy rent
control does not generate the excess demand phenomena (such as key money, waiting lists, and dis-
crimination) of stricter rent control programs, and should have a less adverse eﬀect on the matching
of households to housing units3. Tenancy rent control continues to provide sitting tenants with
improved security of tenure; for one thing, rent regulation within tenancies precludes economic
eviction; for another, because tenancy rent control, like other forms of rent control, provides land-
lords with an incentive to evict tenants, it is invariably accompanied by conversion (rehabilitation,
demolition and reconstruction, and conversion to condominium) restrictions4. As well, tenancy
rent control may be a politically attractive method of partial decontrol since it continues to provide
rent protection to sitting tenants, who are typically the strongest opponents of decontrol. These
beneﬁts must be weighed against the costs. The most obvious costs are the tenant lock-in created
by tenancy rent control and the unfairness of the preferential treatment of sitting tenants. There
are also less obvious costs. The workability of tenancy rent control makes it more diﬃcult to move
to complete decontrol, should this be deemed desirable. Also, because a rent control administration
is kept in place, it is relatively easy to return to harder controls should the political winds change.
Landlords, fearing this, may curtail investment5.
This paper focuses on another less obvious cost of tenancy rent control – its adverse eﬀect on main-
tenance. Pollakowski (1999) provides an empirical analysis of the eﬀects of New York City’s rent
control system on housing maintenance there. Arnott and Johnston (1981) provides an informal,
1This deﬁnes the “ideal type”, which is what will be modeled in this paper. Many jurisdictions have forms of rent
control that are intermediate between tenancy rent control, according to the above deﬁnition, and more traditional
forms of rent control. In some, rent increases are regulated both within and between tenancies, but less severely
between tenancies than within tenancies. In others, rent increases are unregulated between tenancies but are subject
to a variety of regulatory provisions within a tenancy, such as a guideline rent increase (which allows rents to rise
by a certain percentage per year) with a cost-pass-through provision (which allows the landlord to apply for a rent
increase above the guideline rent increase if justiﬁed by cost increases).
2Basu and Emerson (2000, 2003) and Arnott (2003) list some of these jurisdictions. Borsch-Supan (1996) mod-
els the current German system and Iwata (2002) the current Japanese system, both of which are termed “tenant
protection” systems.
3There is a large literature on the adverse eﬀects of rent control. Three particularly good papers that avoid
polemical rent-control bashing are Frankena (1975), Glaeser and Luttmer (2003), and Olsen (1988).
4Miron and Cullingworth (1983) and Hubert (1991) examine the eﬀects of rent control on security of tenure.
5These less obvious costs are evident in the Ontario experience with rent control (e.g., Smith, 2003).
2diagrammatic discussion of the eﬀects of several rent control programs (though not tenancy rent
control) on housing quality and maintenance. This paper will adapt the model of Arnott, David-
son, and Pines (1983) to examine how the application of tenancy rent control to a single atomistic
landlord-builder aﬀects his proﬁt-maximizing behavior6.
Assume, as we will throughout most of the paper in order to abstract from the tenant lock-in eﬀect,
that tenancy duration is exogenous. There are two conﬂicting intuitions concerning the eﬀects
of tenancy rent control on the atomistic landlord’s behavior. A lay person with good economic
intuition would probably argue that tenancy rent control gives the landlord an incentive to spruce
up his units between tenancies so that they “show” well and hence can be let at a higher starting
rent, but little incentive to maintain the units well during tenancies since, after the starting rent
has been agreed upon, maintaining well has no eﬀect on the rent stream during the tenancy. An
economist might however reasonably object that, with tenancy duration exogenous, there is nothing
to prevent the landlord from following the program that is proﬁt maximizing in the absence of
tenancy rent control – which we shall term the eﬃcient program. If the landlord follows this
program, the tenant should be willing to pay as much over her tenancy as she would have for
an uncontrolled unit. This line of reasoning suggests that, were it not for the tenancy lock-in,
the landlord’s proﬁt-maximizing program would be unaﬀected by the application of tenancy rent
control.
The resolution of the two conﬂicting intuitions lies in the ability of the landlord to credibly commit
to the eﬃcient program. If he is able to credibly commit to a maintenance program, he will credibly
commit to the eﬃcient program and the tenant will agree to pay the same in rent in discounted
terms over the duration of the tenancy as in the absence of rent control. The landlord will therefore
be making the same revenue and incurring the same costs as in the absence of rent control, and can
surely do no better than this. Thus, if the landlord can credibly commit to the eﬃcient program,
tenancy rent control alters the timing of rent payments over a tenancy but generates no ineﬃciency.
If, however, the landlord is unable to credibly commit to pursuing the eﬃcient program, once the
lease is signed he has an incentive to pursue a diﬀerent maintenance program, which we term the
opportunistic program. Since the signing of the lease ﬁxes the discounted rent the landlord will
receive over the current tenancy, the only incentive he has to maintain is to improve the quality of
the unit at the end of the lease, as this will increase the discounted rent he receives on subsequent
tenancies. Compared to the eﬃcient program, the opportunistic program entails both a reduction
in average maintenance and a postponement of maintenance within a tenancy. Before the lease is
signed, a prospective tenant should in this situation realize that under tenancy rent control the
landlord will pursue the opportunistic rather than the eﬃcient maintenance program and hence not
be willing to pay as high a starting rent as she would if he were to pursue the eﬃcient program.
The crux of the matter is therefore the landlord’s ability, under tenancy rent control, to commit
to a particular maintenance program. Three commitment mechanisms might be partially eﬀective.
The ﬁrst is contracting on maintenance. One problem with this commitment mechanism is that,
since maintenance is such an amorphous concept, maintenance clauses in the lease would be highly
incomplete; for example, if the contract were to require the landlord to replace appliances every
ten years, he might replace with appliances that are used and reconditioned or of minimal quality.
6Since the analysis is “very” partial equilibrium, it will ignore the eﬀects of tenancy rent control on the level of
rents and on other markets such as the labor market.
While the paper focuses on tenancy rent control, the techniques employed can be applied to examine the eﬀects of
other forms of rent control on the landlord’s optimal program (indeed, Arnott and Johnston (1981) does so, albeit
informally).
3Another problem is that it would be costly for a tenant to document that her landlord had not met
the maintenance terms of the contract. The second commitment mechanism, reputation, is likely to
be ineﬀective since the typical prospective tenant knows little or nothing about diﬀerent landlords’
maintenance performance when she is searching for a unit. The third mechanism, maintenance
regulation, suﬀers from problems similar to those for contracting on maintenance. In our judgment,
such commitment devices are generally ineﬀective, and in our analysis we shall assume them to be
completely ineﬀective. The eﬃciency costs that we identify are reduced to the extent that these
commitment mechanisms are indeed eﬀective.
Section 2 presents a preliminary, stripped-down model that highlights the maintenance distortions
caused by tenancy rent control when landlords are unable to credibly commit to the optimal
program. Section 3 presents the central model in the absence of rent control, which is a particular
case of Arnott, Davidson, and Pines (1983). Section 4 does the same as Section 2 but for the central
model. Section 5 presents some calibrated examples focusing on the magnitude of the eﬃciency
loss caused by tenancy rent control. Section 6 discusses relaxation of various assumptions and
concludes.
2 A Stripped-Down Version of the Model
The central model is quite complex, employing optimal control theory. To elucidate the economics,
we start out with a stripped-down model. This model considers the proﬁt-maximizing maintenance
choices of a landlord who buys a housing unit and then rents it out to the same tenant for two
equal-length periods, at the end of which he sells the unit. The economic environment is stationary;
the interest rate r, the market rent function P(q), which relates per-period rent to housing quality,
the property value function V (q), which relates property value to quality, and the depreciation
function, are all time invariant. Rent is received and maintenance undertaken at the beginning of
each period, while housing is valued at the end of each period. When the landlord buys the housing
unit, its quality is q0. In the absence of maintenance the housing unit deteriorates in quality, and
its deterioration is slowed or even reversed as more is spent on maintenance. The landlord’s chooses
the level of maintenance in each of the two periods so as to maximize the present value of proﬁt.
The maintenance technology is given by the depreciation function
qt = g(qt−1,mt), (1)
which states that quality during period t is a function of quality during the previous period as well
as maintenance undertaken at the beginning of period t. It is assumed that there are positive but
diminishing returns to maintenance, and also that the higher the quality the more must be spent
on maintenance to achieve a given level of depreciation (qt−1 − qt).
We ﬁrst consider the landlord’s proﬁt-maximization problem without any rent control, and then
with tenancy rent control.
2.1 No rent control
Without rent control, the landlord’s proﬁt-maximization problem is a familiar, two-period optimal
investment problem with maintenance and scrap value. His present value of proﬁt over the two
4periods is









Discounted proﬁt equals the discounted rent received plus the discounted sale value, which depends
on second-period quality, minus the purchase price of the unit minus discounted maintenance expen-
diture. The landlord maximizes (2) subject to (1). The economics of the problem are transparent
when (1) is substituted into (2) yielding





(1 + r)2 − m1 −
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where the partial derivatives are for the corresponding depreciation function. Spending a dollar
more on ﬁrst-period maintenance increases the present value of revenue in three ways. First-period
quality increases by ∂q1/∂m1, which increases ﬁrst-period rent by P0(q1)[∂q1/∂m1]; second-period
quality increases by [∂q2/∂q1][∂q1/∂m1], which increases discounted second-period rent by this
amount times P0(q2)/(1 + r) and discounted sales price by this amount times V 0(q2)/(1 + r)2. Eq.
(4) indicates that maintenance should be carried to the point where the discounted revenue from
the marginal dollar spent on maintenance equals one dollar. The interpretation of (5) is analogous.
2.2 Tenancy rent control
Now consider the situation with tenancy rent control under the assumptions that the landlord
cannot commit to a particular maintenance program prior to the signing of the lease and that the
duration of the tenancy is exogenous. The landlord will ﬁrst sign a lease with the tenant. Under
tenancy rent control, the lease speciﬁes a starting rent, and then the rent control formula determines
the time path of rent over the tenancy as a function of the starting rent. Under the assumption that
tenancy duration is exogenous, the discounted revenue over the tenancy is therefore determined
when the lease is signed. And under the assumption that the landlord cannot commit to a particular
maintenance program, he makes his maintenance decisions taking the discounted revenue over the
tenancy as ﬁxed. In particular, he chooses the ﬁrst- and second-period maintenance levels so as to

























/(1 + r) = 0. (8)
Eq. (7) states that the landlord will spend on ﬁrst-period maintenance up to the point where the
marginal dollar increases the discounted sales price of the unit by one dollar. Spending more on
maintenance will not alter the rent he receives in either the ﬁrst or second period. The interpretation
of (8) is analogous.
Comparing eqs. (4) and (7), it appears that ﬁrst-period maintenance is lower under tenancy rent
control since, unlike the unregulated situation, spending more on maintenance does not increase the
present value of rent. The marginal beneﬁt of ﬁrst-period maintenance is lower with rent control
than without, and the marginal cost is the same. Similarly, comparing (5) and (8), it appears
that second-period maintenance is lower under tenancy rent control too. Thus, the application of
tenancy rent control appears to discourage maintenance. We say “appears to” since the reasoning
is based on a comparison of two single equations, each from a diﬀerent system of equations7.
Comparing the pair of eqs. (4) and (7) and then (5) and (8), it appears as well that tenancy rent
control also causes a postponement of maintenance. The application of rent control causes the
marginal beneﬁt of maintenance to shift down proportionally more for ﬁrst-period than for second-
period maintenance, since in the unregulated situation the eﬀect of maintenance on discounted rent
relative to its eﬀect on sales price is larger in the ﬁrst period than in the second.
The eﬀects of tenancy rent control are actually more complicated than the above model suggests
since the application of controls alters not only maintenance in the two periods but also the property
value function. If tenancy rent control is applied to only a small portion of the relevant housing
market (so that the demand for controlled housing at each quality level is perfectly elastic), then the
deadweight loss associated with tenancy rent control is fully capitalized into the sales price function.
If tenancy rent control is more broadly applied, determination of the eﬀects of the controls on the
sales price function requires a full general equilibrium analysis of the housing market.
2.3 Comparison using speciﬁc functional forms
The aim of this section is to illustrate that, when the landlord is unable to commit to a maintenance
program, the application of tenancy rent control causes maintenance to be reduced and also post-
poned towards the end of the tenancy. This subsection develops a speciﬁc example illustrating these
eﬀects. We shall assume that: i) in the absence of rent control the rent function is P(q) = f + hq;
ii) the depreciation function is qt = g(qt−1,mt) = (1 − δ)qt−1 + 2a
√
mt for t = 1,2; and iii) the
sales price function is V (q) = β +γq. In the absence of maintenance housing quality depreciates at
the geometric rate δ, and there are diminishing returns to maintenance. The rent and sales price
functions are both linear.










1+r. With θ = 1, this
is the maximand in the absence of rent control (except for a constant that does not aﬀect the ﬁrst-order conditions),
and with θ = 0, the maximand under tenancy rent control. Thus, the two programs can be rigorously compared by
totally diﬀerentiating the ﬁrst-order conditions of Y with respect to θ.
6Figure 1: Discounted marginal beneﬁt and marginal cost of maintenance in periods 1 and 2 with
and without tenancy rent control. The parameter values are h = 1, γ = 2, r = 0.0375, a = 0.2,
δ = 0.03.
Consider ﬁrst the situation without rent control. Substituting P0(q) = h, V 0(q2) = γ, ∂q2/∂q1 =
1 − δ, and ∂qt/∂mt = am
−1/2
















Thus, as intuition would suggest, the proﬁt-maximizing level of maintenance in both periods is
higher, the steeper the rent and sales price functions, the more eﬀective the maintenance (measured
by α), and the lower the discount rate. First-period maintenance is also higher the lower is the
depreciation rate, δ, since with a lower depreciation rate ﬁrst-period maintenance has a larger eﬀect
on second-period quality and therefore sales price and second-period rent.













where ˆ denotes the value of a variable with rent control. Comparison of (9) and (11) indicates
that the application of tenancy rent control lowers ﬁrst-period maintenance, and comparison of
(10) and (12) that tenancy rent control lowers second-period maintenance too. From (9) to (12),





















so that rent control not only reduces maintenance in each period but also tilts maintenance towards
the second period of the tenancy.
The above model is incomplete since it explains neither how the housing unit of quality q0 came into
being, nor how the property value function is determined. We could close the model by introducing
housing construction, but have chosen to do this in the context of the central model, to which we
now turn.
3 The Central Model without Rent Control
The central model diﬀers from the stripped-down model in treating time as continuous. This allows
optimal control theory and phase plane analysis to be applied, and permits a neat and transparent
closing of the model.
A competitive landlord-builder owns a vacant lot on which only a single unit of housing can be con-
structed8. Housing is durable and its quality is endogenous. Multiple quality-changing technologies
are in principle available, including construction, maintenance, demolition and reconstruction, and
rehabilitation. The economic environment is stationary and described by the quality-changing tech-
nologies, the rent function relating market rent to quality, and the interest rate. The maintenance
technology is autonomous – the unit’s rate of quality change depends on its current quality and the
current level of maintenance expenditure but not on the unit’s age per se. The landlord chooses
the proﬁt-maximizing program. Under these assumptions, phase plane analysis shall be employed.
A general analysis of “the landlord’s problem” is presented in Arnott, Davidson, and Pines (1983).
We focus on the practically most realistic case in which, in the absence of controls, at the beginning
of the program it is proﬁt maximizing to construct and then to downgrade to saddlepoint quality.
In the working paper (Arnott and Shevyakhova, 2007), the quality-changing technologies permit-
ted three qualitatively diﬀerent active programs: initial construction followed by downgrading to
saddlepoint quality, a construction-downgrading-demolition cycle, and initial construction followed
by a downgrading-rehabilitation cycle. We showed there, as intuition would suggest, that which
program is proﬁt maximizing depends on the relative costs of maintenance, construction, and reha-
bilitation. Here, to simplify, we restrict the analysis to the case of initial construction followed by
8The analysis can be extended straightforwardly to endogenize structural density (Arnott, Davidson, and Pines,
1986).
8downgrading to saddlepoint quality, essentially assuming that, both with and without rent control,
this program is proﬁt maximizing, which occurs when maintenance is cheap relative to construction
and rehabilitation, and is broadly consistent with one variant of the classical ﬁltering hypothesis,
which states that in an unregulated housing market, actual quality-changing technologies are such
that housing deteriorates as it ages9.
3.1 Analysis of optimal program without rent control
At time 0 the landlord constructs a single housing unit of quality qc on his lot and then downgrades
the unit asymptotically to saddlepoint quality qS. Where q(t) is quality at time t, P (q) the
exogenous rent function, m(t) maintenance expenditure at time t, r the interest rate, α construction
cost per unit of quality, g(q,m) the depreciation function10, and T the terminal time, the proﬁt-





(P (q (t)) − m(t))e−rtdt − αqc
i) ˙ q = g (q,m)
s.t. ii) qc ≡ q (0) free
iii) limT↑∞ q (T) free
(13)
Note that quality is measured as some fraction of construction costs, and that tenant maintenance
is not considered. We impose non-negativity conditions on q and m. Where 0s denote derivatives
and subscripts partial derivatives, we also impose reasonable restrictions on the functions P and
g: i) P(0) = 0, P0(q) > 0 and P00(q) < 0; and ii) gq < 0, gm(q,0) = ∞, g(q,0) < 0, gm(q,∞) = 0,
gm > 0, gmm < 0. Thus, rent increases with quality but at a diminishing rate; there are positive
but diminishing returns to maintenance; holding ﬁxed the rate of quality deterioration, more has
to be spent on maintenance as quality increases; and with zero maintenance, the unit deteriorates.
In our numerical examples, the ﬁrst-order conditions of the optimal program will deﬁne a unique
interior maximum.
We solve the problem using optimal control theory (Kamien and Schwartz, 1991). The current-value
Hamiltonian corresponding to (13) is
H◦ = P (q (t)) − m(t) + φ(t)g (q (t),m(t)), (14)
where φ(t) is current-value co-state variable on
·
q = g (q,m). The ﬁrst-order condition11 for main-
tenance is
−1 + φ(t)gm (q (t),m(t)) = 0. (15)
Since φ(t) is the marginal value of quality at time t, and gm(q(t),m(t)) the amount by which
quality is increased by an extra dollar’s expenditure on maintenance, φgm is the marginal beneﬁt
9There are many diﬀerent variants of the ﬁltering hypothesis. Another states that in an unregulated housing
market, a housing unit is occupied by relatively poorer households as it ages. Another way of saying this is that it
is eﬃcient for the poor to live in hand-me-down housing. This variant of the ﬁltering hypothesis has been central
to economic arguments against public housing, since public housing entails the construction of new housing for the
poor.
10g(q,m) is actually the negative-of-depreciation function.
11Throughout the analysis we shall omit second-order conditions but we check that they are satisﬁed in our
numerical examples.
9from maintenance. Thus, at each point in time, maintenance should be such that marginal beneﬁt
equals marginal cost. The conditions imposed on gm guarantee that there is a unique, interior
optimal level of maintenance expenditure for all non-negative values of q and φ; thus, we may write
m = m(q,φ) with mφ > 0. Inserting this function into (14) yields the maximized current-value
Hamiltonian:
H(q,φ) = P (q) − m(q,φ) + φg (q,m(q,φ)). (16)
The equation of motion of the co-state variable is
·
φ = rφ − Hq = rφ − P
0
− φgq. (17)
The assumptions thus far have not ruled out the possibility that the optimal saddlepoint program
entails upgrading to saddlepoint quality via maintenance alone. We assume that the maintenance
and construction technologies are such that the optimal saddlepoint program entails construction
at the start of the program. The transversality condition with respect to qc is then
φ(0) = α; (18)
construction quality should be increased up to the point where the marginal value of quality equals
its marginal cost.
We are now in a position to construct the phase plane corresponding to this program. We assume
that: i) the ˙ q = 0 locus is positively sloped; ii) the ˙ φ = 0 locus is negatively sloped; and iii) the
˙ q = 0 locus and ˙ φ = 0 locus intersect in the positive orthant. Thus, there is a unique saddlepoint,
S = (qS,φS). We assume furthermore that φS > α. Figure 2 displays a phase plane consistent with
these assumptions. As is the case for all subsequent ﬁgures, Figure 2 is drawn for the functional
forms and parameters used in the base-case numerical example presented in Section 5.
We also have the inﬁnite horizon transversality conditions associated with terminal quality and
terminal time. Arnott, Davidson, and Pines (1983) proves that, under the assumptions made, these
conditions imply that the optimal trajectory must terminate at the saddlepoint. Putting together
the necessary conditions for optimality, we obtain that the optimal program entails construction at
that quality at which the right stable arm intersects the φ = α line, qA, followed by downgrading
along the stable arm to the saddlepoint.
For an autonomous optimal control problem with discounting, the value of the program at any






The economic interpretation is that the value of the Hamiltonian gives the economic return per
unit time from owning the property, which includes the net (of expenses and depreciation) earnings
stream it generates plus capital gains, and competitive asset pricing requires that the net return
per unit time from owning an asset equal the asset price times the discount rate.
With some abuse of notation, we denote the value of the maximized Hamiltonian at a point labeled
X in the phase plane by H(X). The value of the program immediately after initial construction is
then
H(A)
r , so that the value of the program immediately before initial construction, which is the
value of the program, is V ∗ =
H(A)
r − αqA.
10Figure 2: Phase plane for construction with downgrading to the steady state.
4 Tenancy Rent Control
We model tenancy rent control as a ceiling on the time path of rents over the duration of a tenancy,
conditional on the starting rent12. Letting ps denote the starting rent, u the length of time into the
tenancy, and F(ps,u) (with ∂F/∂ps > 0) the rent control function – the maximum allowable rent
u years into a tenancy, conditional on ps – a tenancy rent control program imposes the constraint
that b P(u) ≤ F(ps,u), where b P(u) is the rent charged by the landlord u years into the tenancy.
4.1 Assumptions
We shall examine the eﬀects of tenancy rent control applied to a single housing unit when all
other units are uncontrolled; the analysis is therefore partial equilibrium. We make a number of
simplifying assumptions:
Assumption 1 The length of a tenancy is exogenous at L.
12There are tenancy rent control programs that restrict the percentage increase in rent from one year to the next.
Under such a program, a landlord might ﬁnd it proﬁt maximizing to charge less than the maximum allowable rent
increase for some time interval during a tenancy, in which case the ceiling on the time path of rents would thereafter
be determined by the rent level at the time the percentage increase regulation again becomes binding. Thus, our
modeling of tenancy rent control entails a simpliﬁcation.
11This assumption is made for two reasons. First, we wish to abstract from the eﬀect of tenancy rent
control on tenancy duration, in order to focus on its eﬀects on landlord maintenance and conversion.
Second, the assumption takes into account that tenancy rent control is invariably accompanied by
restrictions on eviction13. Since tenancy rent control front-end loads rent over a tenancy, shorter
tenancies are more proﬁtable for landlords. In the absence of restrictions on eviction, tenancy rent
control would therefore provide landlords with an incentive to evict tenants14.
Assumption 2 The rent control function is such that the landlord ﬁnds it proﬁt maximizing to
charge the maximum controlled rent over the duration of a tenancy, i.e. b P(u) = F(ps,u).
This assumption states that, under the opportunistic program, the time path of controlled rents
over a tenancy are suﬃciently front-end loaded relative to the time path of market rents that
the tenancy rent control constraint binds strictly throughout the tenancy. While not primitive,
this assumption greatly simpliﬁes the analysis since otherwise the possibility would have to be
considered that the rent control constraint binds over some quality intervals but not over others.
Assumption 3 Tenants are identical.
Assumption 4 Tenants face perfect capital markets and discount ﬁnancial ﬂows at the same rate
as the landlord.
With identical tenants, the market rent as a function of quality adjusts so that a renter receives the
same utility at all quality levels. Thus, under tenancy rent control, a tenant is indiﬀerent between
living in a controlled and uncontrolled unit if and only if the discounted value of controlled rents
over the tenancy equals the discounted value of market rents for the same quality path, discounted
at her discount rate. The assumption that the tenant’s discount rate is the same as the landlord’s
is made to simplify the analysis.
Under the above assumptions, the opportunistic program is independent of the form of the rent
control function. A proof runs as follows. Suppose that the proﬁt-maximizing program with a
particular rent control function has been solved for. Now modify the rent control function, holding
constant the time path of maintenance, and therefore of quality, but allowing the starting rents
for each tenancy to adjust so that tenants remain indiﬀerent between controlled and uncontrolled
housing. The proﬁtability of the program remains unchanged and the landlord cannot improve
proﬁtability by altering the program. Without ambiguity, we may then let ˆ q(u;qs) denote the time
path of quality over a tenancy under the opportunistic program, conditional on starting quality qs.
And the condition that, with the opportunistic program, over each tenancy the discounted value
of controlled rents equals the discounted value of market rents may be written as
13We use the term eviction to mean that the tenant is required to leave her unit even though she would prefer not
to, rather than in the legal sense.
14Tenancy rent control rules out economic eviction (raising rents to force a tenant out) but at least in North
America, where annual tenancies are the norm, a landlord can evict a tenant in some jurisdictions simply by choosing
not to renew the lease, and in others by citing as just causes minor lease violations or his intention to lease the unit
to a family member, convert it to owner occupancy, or rehabilitate it. Recall that the working paper analyzes the
situations where a demolition cycle or rehabilitation is most proﬁtable. Assumption 1 implies that, under tenancy







Thus, under the above assumptions, it is the imposition of tenancy rent control rather than its
severity15 that matters since it is the imposition of tenancy rent control that undermines the
credibility of the eﬃcient program.
In the previous section we assumed that, in the absence of rent control, it is proﬁt maximizing for
the landlord to construct and then downgrade to saddlepoint quality. In this section we assume
that this is proﬁt-maximizing under tenancy rent control as well. Put alternatively, we assume
that maintenance is suﬃciently cheap relative to construction and rehabilitation that both with
and without rent control the most proﬁtable course of action for the landlord is to construct and
then downgrade to saddlepoint quality.
4.2 Analysis of optimal program with rent control
The proﬁt-maximizing program with rent control, too, entails construction followed by downgrading
from one tenancy to the next, but maintenance follows a sawtooth pattern, increasing within each
tenancy and then falling discontinuously from the end of one tenancy to the start of the next. The
program converges to a steady-state tenancy maintenance cycle in which quality is highest at the
beginning and end of each tenancy, rather than to a steady-state quality.
We decompose solution of the opportunistic program under tenancy rent control during a single
tenancy into two stages. In the ﬁrst stage, we solve the program taking as given not only the
initial quality of the unit and the duration of the tenancy but also the terminal quality. In the
second stage, we solve for the proﬁt-maximizing terminal quality. The landlord decides on this
program after the lease has been signed, and therefore after his discounted rent over the tenancy
has been determined. The ﬁrst-stage problem entails the minimization of discounted maintenance
expenditures needed to achieve terminal quality, qL, taking as given the starting quality, qs, and the
tenancy duration, L. This is an elementary optimal control program with a well-known solution.
Deﬁne J(qs,qL,L) to be the value of this program. We shall use three properties of the solution:
∂J/∂qs = φ(0) ∂J/∂qL = −φ(L)e−rL ˙ φ = rφ − φgq (19)
where φ(t) is the current value of the co-state variable on ˙ q = g(q,m). The ﬁrst solution property
indicates that φ(0) is the marginal value of quality at the start of the tenancy, after the tenancy
contract has been signed. The second indicates that φ(L) is the marginal value of terminal quality
at terminal time, so that φ(L)e−rL is the marginal value of terminal quality discounted to the
beginning of the tenancy. Since the ﬁrst stage of the problem entails deciding on the maintenance
path over the tenancy, after the contract has been signed, we refer to φ as the ex post (viz., after
the tenancy contract has been signed) marginal value of quality. The last solution property is that
over a tenancy the ex post marginal value of quality grows16 at the rate r−gq through the tenancy.
15A tenancy rent control program is more severe than another if it permits a lower nominal percentage increase in
rent every year during a tenancy. Assumption A.2 is that the tenancy rent control program is suﬃciently severe that
the landlord ﬁnds it proﬁt maximizing to charge the maximum controlled rent over the duration of the tenancy. If the
tenancy rent control program is suﬃciently “lax” that the landlord ﬁnds it proﬁt maximizing to charge the maximum
controlled rent over no portion of the tenancy, the program has no eﬀect. Intermediate situations are analytically
messy.
16Suppose the landlord buys an extra unit of quality today at a price of φ. Instantaneously, he must make
13The second stage of the solution of the opportunistic program entails the choice of qL. To derive this,
we work with a value function. Under tenancy rent control, the value of a housing unit is a function
not only of quality but also of how much time remains in the current tenancy contract17. Let b V (q)
denote the value of a housing unit of quality q between tenancies, and Z(qs) the revenue received
over a tenancy contract, discounted to the beginning of the tenancy contract. The landlord decides
on the maintenance program, and hence qL, after signing the tenancy contract, and therefore after
the revenue received over the tenancy has been determined. Then the value function b V (q) may be
written as
b V (qs) = Z(qs) + maxqL[J(qs,qL,L) + b V (qL)e−rL]. (20)
Terminal quality is chosen to maximize the expression in square brackets. The corresponding
ﬁrst-order condition is
∂J/∂qL + b V 0(qL)e−rL = 0. (21)
Comparing the second equation in (19) and (21) yields
φ(L) = b V 0(qL). (22)
Diﬀerentiating (20) with respect to qs yields
b V 0(qs) = Z0(qs) + ∂J/∂qs (using the envelope theorem)
= Z0(qs) + φ(0) (using (19)). (23)
Eq. (23) requires some care in interpretation. b V 0(qs) is the ex ante (before the tenancy contract
has been signed) marginal value of quality at the start of a tenancy, while φ(0) is the ex post (after
the tenancy contract has been signed) marginal value of quality at the start of a tenancy. Eq.
(23) indicates that, at starting quality, the ex ante marginal value of quality exceeds the ex post
marginal value of quality by Z0(qs), marginal discounted revenue. Thus, there is a downward jump
discontinuity in the marginal value of quality at the time the lease is signed. Now return to (22).
It states that, in contrast, the marginal value of quality immediately before the termination of the
tenancy equals the marginal value of quality immediately afterwards, in both cases equaling the
increase in the sales price from a unit increase in terminal quality.
The value of the program immediately prior to construction is
b V ∗ = max
qc
h
b V (qc) − αqc
i
. (24)
Assuming an interior solution, the corresponding ﬁrst-order condition for proﬁt-maximizing con-
struction quality is
b V 0(qc) − α = 0. (25)
Comparing (23) and (25), for the ﬁrst tenancy, since qc = qs,
φ(0) = α − Z0(qc). (26)
the competitive return on that unit, rφ, and the return comprises two components, the capital gain, ˙ φ, minus the
depreciation, −φgq.
17Since the housing market remains competitive under rent control, it must still be the case that owning the
property for an increment of time between u and u + du within a tenancy provides income of rV (q(u),u), where
V (q(u),u) is the market value of a controlled housing unit of quality q u units of time into a tenancy. From
this relationship, the rent control function, and the boundary condition that b V (qs) = V (qs,0), V (q(u),u) may be
calculated.
14Figure 3: Phase plane for construction-downgrading to the steady-state cycle under rent control.
Construction occurs at that quality level for which the ex ante marginal value of quality via con-
struction equals the marginal cost, while the ex post marginal value of construction quality falls
short of marginal construction cost by Z0(qc).
In the steady state, quality varies within a tenancy, but the starting and terminal qualities remain
constant from one tenancy to the next. Let qσ be the optimal starting and terminal quality of a
steady state cycle. Since in a steady-state tenancy qs = qL = qσ,
b V (qσ) =
1
1 − e−rL{Z(qσ) + J(qσ,qσ,L)}.
Figure 3 displays the phase diagram of the optimal program under rent control for the numerical ex-
ample, and plots the optimal trajectory for two tenancies, the ﬁrst tenancy that occurs immediately
after construction and the steady-state tenancy. For comparison it also plots the optimal (stable
arm) trajectory without rent control. With the depreciation function we employ, maintenance ex-
penditures are positively related to φ and independent of q. The diminished incentive to maintain
under tenancy rent control is reﬂected in the lower position, on average, of the optimal trajectory
under tenancy rent control. The incentive under tenancy rent control to postpone maintenance
expenditures towards the end of the tenancy is also evident.
155 Numerical Examples
This section presents a series of related numerical examples with the aim of quantifying the eﬀects
of tenancy rent control. The eﬃciency loss caused by the commitment problem is of special interest.
5.1 Choice of functional forms and parameters
We had hoped to draw on the empirical literature in our choice of functional forms and parameters.
Unfortunately, there seem to be no empirical studies that have employed the Arnott, Davidson,
and Pines (1983) conceptual framework as the basis for empirical analysis. As a result, we adopt
the more modest goal of developing numerical examples whose parameters and functional forms
are “reasonable”. We chose the functional forms so as to obtain equations of motion that are the
solutions to linear diﬀerential equations, as well as (for the case of rent control) closed-form value
functions. And we chose the parameters to generate plausible results.
As in the theoretical analysis, we measure quality as proportional to construction costs. We assume
the following functional forms for the rent function, the construction cost function C(q), and the
depreciation function:
P(q) = eq −
fq2
2
C(q) = αq ˙ q = −δq + 2am1/2 ,
The rent equation generates a linear, downward-sloping marginal-willingness-to-pay-for-quality
function. The depreciation function is about the simplest possible. In the absence of mainte-
nance, quality depreciates exponentially at the rate δ. A given level of maintenance expenditure
slows down the rate of quality depreciation by an amount that is independent of quality, and there
are diminishing returns to maintenance. The optimal expenditure on maintenance is given by a2φ2;
maintenance expenditure is therefore increasing in φ and independent of q. Substituting the ex-
pression for optimal maintenance into the depreciation function gives the maximized depreciation
function,
˙ q = −δq + 2a2φ. (27)
In the absence of rent control, these equations imply a co-state equation of the form
˙ φ = (r + δ)φ − e + fq, (28)
and with tenancy rent control18,
˙ φ = (r + δ)φ. (29)
In the absence of rent control, these equations of motion correspond to a phase plane with a linear,




δ(r + δ) + 2a2f
φS =
eδ
δ(r + δ) + 2a2f
.
18Thus, both with and without rent control, the state and co-state equations are together a pair of linear ﬁrst-
order diﬀerential equations in q and φ. In the absence of rent control, substituting one into the other generates
linear, second-order diﬀerential equations for q alone and φ alone. And with rent control, (29) is a linear, ﬁrst-order
diﬀerential equation in φ alone, and substituting the solution to (29) into (27) results in a linear, ﬁrst-order diﬀerential
equation in q alone.
16With rent control, the ˙ φ = 0 line coincides with the q-axis, so that the ˙ q = 0 and ˙ φ = 0 lines do
not intersect in the interior of the phase plane.
We take as our units of measurement years and hundreds of thousands of dollars. Our assumed
base-case parameters are:
δ = 0.03, r = 0.0375, a = 0.2121, e = 0.055, f = 0.005, L = 10, and α = 0.5.
These parameters imply a saddlepoint quality of 2.0, saddlepoint maintenance of 0.02 ($2000 per
year), saddlepoint rent of 0.10 ($10000 per year), and a value of the co-state variable (the marginal
value of quality) at the saddlepoint of 0.667.
As the model has been speciﬁed, the “cap rate” (the capitalization rate, the ratio of rent net
of expenditures to property value) equals the interest rate. In the absence of rent control, the
property value – the value of the program – at saddlepoint quality equals rent net of maintenance
expenditures, all divided by the cap rate, $213,333. Thus, at the saddlepoint, the ratio of annual
maintenance expenditures to property value is slightly under 1%, which is broadly consistent with
the 1% rule of real estate management, which states that annual maintenance expenditures on a
building average around 1% of building value. If a housing unit were constructed at saddlepoint
quality, it would cost $100,000 to build. Thus, property value minus structure costs is $113,333,
and the ratio of construction cost to property value is 0.53, which is reasonable.
While our base-case parameter values lead to reasonable results, we have little conﬁdence in them,
since there has been little empirical work estimating the parameters of the maintenance technol-
ogy19, and since the other demand and construction cost parameters can be expected to exhibit
considerable geographic variation: α depends on labor costs, the cost of construction materials, and
the climate, and the demand parameters vary considerably not only across metropolitan areas but
also within each metropolitan area, reﬂecting diﬀerences in local amenities and accessibility. To take
into account our uncertainty about parameters, we shall investigate the sensitivity of the numerical
results to parameter variation, within the subset of parameter values for which the saddlepoint
program is the most proﬁtable both with and without rent control.
5.2 Numerical solution procedures
The details of the numerical solution procedures employed are presented in the Appendix of Arnott
and Shevyakhova (2007). Here we just describe in broad terms the general approaches. In the
absence of rent control, the solution procedure centers on solving for the parameters of a second-
order linear diﬀerential equation for φ, since everything else can be solved for once these parameters
are obtained. One parameter is obtained from the initial condition that φ(0) = α, and (in the case
of the saddlepoint program, on which we focus in this version of the paper) the second parameter
is obtained from the φ coordinate of the saddlepoint.
The approach taken to solve the optimal program with tenancy rent control is more complex. It is
convenient to express the unknown parameters in the functions φ(t) and q(t) in terms of q(0) and
q(L). This allows us to obtain the discounted revenue received over a tenancy, Z(qs), and the net
19Rothenberg et al. (1991) estimate a housing market model whose speciﬁcation draws heavily on the Sweeney
(1974a) ﬁltering model, which conceptualizes the landlord’s problem in much the same way as Arnott, Davidson,
and Pines (1983) except that it treats housing quality as discrete rather than continuous and assumes that housing
deteriorates in quality as it ages.
17value of a tenancy cycle, J(qs,qL,L). We then make a conjecture about the form of ˆ V (q). Next,
using (21) to determine qL(qs) and plugging it into (20) we apply the method of undetermined
coeﬃcients to solve for ˆ V (q). The ﬁnal step is to ﬁnd the construction quality, qc, using (25).
5.3 Examples
We record the results of our numerical examples in Tables 1A and 1B. Table 1A gives the results
in the absence of rent control, and Table 1B those with tenancy rent control. With the functional
forms assumed: from (27) the ˙ q = 0 line is φ =
δq
2a2; the ˙ φ = 0 line is φ =
e−fq
r+δ without rent control
(from (28)) and φ = 0 with rent control (from (29)); and expressions for the saddlepoint q and φ
are given in expressions below (29).
Table 1A: How the eﬃcient program changes with a 10% increase in individual parameters – No
rent control
base case α= 0.55 r = 0.04125 δ= 0.033 a = 0.23331 e = 0.0605 f = 0.0055
qs 5.3972 4.3780 4.8186 5.0929 5.2537 6.9561 4.8439
V (qs) 4.1150 3.5800 3.5381 3.7995 4.1268 5.5142 3.7462
V (qs) − αqs
= SV
1.4164 1.1721 1.1288 1.2531 1.4999 2.0362 1.3242
m(qs) 0.0113 0.0136 0.0113 0.0113 0.0136 0.0113 0.0113
qS 2.0 2.0 1.9130 1.7828 2.3304 2.20 1.9643
m(q
S) 0.0200 0.02 0.0183 0.0192 0.0224 0.0242 0.0193
V (q
S) 2.1333 2.1333 1.8853 1.8901 2.4573 2.5813 2.0835
The ﬁrst column of numbers in each table applies for the base-case parameter values. We
have already commented on the base-case program without rent control. How the application of
rent control aﬀects the optimal program has been shown in Figure 3. Construction quality rises
very slightly, from 5.40 to 5.49. Steady-state quality (measured as qS without rent control and qσ
with rent control) falls, from 2.00 to 1.54. Also, at almost all quality levels maintenance (given by
m = a2φ2) is lower and depreciation more rapid with rent control. Thus, as intuition suggests, the
application of rent control causes housing quality to fall on average. Finally, as already explained,
under tenancy rent control, maintenance follows a saw-tooth pattern, rising within each tenancy,
and then falling discontinuously between tenancies.
Table 1B: How the opportunistic program changes with a 10% increase in individual parameters –
Rent Control
18base case α= 0.55 r = 0.04125 δ = 0.033 a = 0.23331 e = 0.0605 f = 0.0055
q
(1)
s 5.4892 4.4789 4.9126 5.1887 5.3639 7.0485 4.9355
V (q
(1)
s ) 4.1250 3.5945 3.5507 3.8088 4.1394 5.5216 3.7564
V (q
(1)




1.3803 1.1311 1.0944 1.2145 1.4574 1.9974 1.2886
m(q
(1)
s ) 0.0036 0.0041 0.0032 0.0034 0.0042 0.0038 0.0036
m(q
(1)
L ) 0.0138 0.0157 0.0134 0.0138 0.0164 0.0148 0.0137
m(q
(2)
s ) 0.0041 0.0045 0.0036 0.0038 0.0048 0.0046 0.0041
qσ 1.5423 1.5423 1.4529 1.3554 1.8102 1.6966 1.5201
m(q
(∞)
s ) 0.0056 0.0056 0.0048 0.0051 0.0064 0.0068 0.0055
m(q
(∞)
L ) 0.0218 0.0218 0.0199 0.0208 0.0248 0.0263 0.0211
V (qσ) 1.7660 1.7660 1.5348 1.5482 2.0522 2.1369 1.7322
DWL 0.0361 0.0409 0.0344 0.0386 0.0425 0.0388 0.0356
DWL/d SV 0.0255 0.0349 0.0305 0.0308 0.0283 0.0191 0.0269
PV rent 4.3599 3.8464 3.7431 4.0344 4.4135 5.7882 3.9872





L indicate the initial and terminal qualities at the beginning and end of the ith
tenancy cycle, respectively.
The absolute deadweight loss due to the application of tenancy rent control is measured as the
(pre-construction) value of the program without rent control, which is also the site value at time 0,
SV , minus the value of the program with rent control, S ˆ V . Thus, DWL = SV − S ˆ V , which equals
0.0361, or $3,610. What should this be measured relative to? One possibility is the pre-rent-control
site value, which is the social value of the land on which the housing unit is built at time t = 0.
We could then say that the application of tenancy rent control dissipates 2.55% of the social value
of land (DWL/SV × 100). We think it more intuitive to measure deadweight loss relative to the
present value of housing rent, or equivalently to measure the average annualized deadweight loss
relative to average housing rent. According to this measure, the relative deadweight loss from the
application of tenancy rent control is 0.83%. We judge that this degree of relative deadweight loss
is “modest but not insigniﬁcant”, and conjecture that it is substantially smaller than the typical
relative deadweight loss due to tenancy lock-in, which we discuss in the next section.
Since there is little empirical work on which to base our calibration, we chose parameter values that
give “reasonable” rather than “realistic” results. We should therefore enquire into the sensitivity of
our numerical results to parameter values. The other columns of the tables report the results of this
sensitivity analysis. Each column records the solution when only one parameter is increased by 10%
relative to its base-case value. Thus, comparing the solution for the base case to the solution for
any other column shows the sensitivity of the solution to a change in the corresponding parameter
value. All the results can be readily explained in terms of the Figure 3 phase diagram. For example,
the 10% increase in construction cost alters the phase plane in only one respect – the φ = α line
shifts up from 0.5 to 0.55. The ˙ q = 0 line, the ˙ φ = 0 lines with and without rent control, and
the trajectories in the phase plane remain unaltered. Since construction becomes more expensive
relative to maintenance, proﬁt-maximizing construction quality falls. In the absence of rent control,
the optimal trajectory remains the (unchanged) stable arm path, but starts at a lower quality level;
with rent control, the ﬁrst tenancy cycle starts at a lower quality but the steady-state tenancy cycle
remains unchanged. Explaining how the absolute and relative deadweight losses are aﬀected by
19the 10% parameter changes is more involved, but the deadweight loss results are not particularly
sensitive to (as measured by the elasticity of the deadweight loss measure to the parameter value)
any parameter value20. Thus, we assert with fair conﬁdence that the ﬂow deadweight loss due to
the commitment-in-maintenance failure deriving from tenancy rent control is of the order of 1% of
rent.
6 Discussion
The amount written on rent control has been quite out of proportion to its importance as a housing
policy. Economists have devoted so much attention to it because rent control has provided a focal
point for studying and debating how regulated – as well as unregulated – housing markets work and
how extensive government intervention in the market should be. For example, while this paper has
studied how tenancy rent control may generate a commitment-in-maintenance failure, the failure
occurs more generally, in all long-term rental contracts for housing and other capital goods for
which the owner does all the maintenance, whether or not the contracts are regulated.
The aim of this section is to place the paper in a broader context. The ﬁrst subsection provides
a broader discussion of the eﬀects of tenancy rent control on maintenance. The second provides
some general remarks on tenancy rent control.
6.1 Tenancy rent control and maintenance
The paper’s central model assumed a lot away in order to focus on the commitment failure. This
subsection will provide a broader discussion of tenancy rent control and maintenance, by considering
how the results of the paper are modiﬁed when various assumptions are relaxed.
• The modeling of maintenance
Our model assumed that maintenance is homogeneous but it is not. Some maintenance activities
are undertaken daily or weekly, others only every so many years; some are purely cosmetic or
counter style obsolescence, while others are invisible but prevent structural deterioration; and so
on. Treating maintenance as homogeneous ignores that tenancy rent control may alter not only
the level of expenditure on maintenance but also its composition.
While the model assumed that all maintenance is undertaken by the landlord, tenant maintenance
is important too. In the absence of rent control, the landlord is typically responsible for maintaining
the public areas of a building, but the division of responsibility between landlord and tenant for
maintenance within apartments varies considerably. Even when the rent function and tenancy
duration are exogenous, which we continue to assume for the moment, there are strategic aspects
to this division of responsibility. Both the landlord and the tenant have an incentive to drag their
feet hoping that the other will perform the needed maintenance. Also, the landlord but not the
tenant is concerned with the quality of the apartment at the end of the tenancy21. In this scenario,
the application of tenancy rent control has two eﬀects. The commitment-in-maintenance failure
20Due to the functional form of P(q), a 10% rise in e causes more than a 10% rise in the rent function.
21Sweeney (1974b) argues that for this reason maintenance is lower in rental than in owner-occupied housing.
20continues to operate, but also the tenant has a stronger incentive to maintain since she realizes
that the landlord’s incentive is weakened.
• Endogenous tenancy duration
The model assumed that tenancy duration is exogenous and ignored separation costs. Continue to
ignore separation costs but make tenancy duration endogenous. In the absence of rent control, the
analysis is unaﬀected since landlord proﬁt is independent of the rate of tenant turnover. Under
tenancy rent control, however, since rents are front-end loaded, a tenant has an incentive to stay
in her unit longer than she otherwise would22. This lock-in eﬀect inﬂuences the opportunistic
program.
Drawing on the search-and-matching literature, endogenous tenancy duration and this lock-in ef-
fect may be modeled as follows. Continue to assume that tenants are (ex ante) identical. Each
receives oﬀers to move to a diﬀerent apartment according to a Poisson process. Each oﬀer indicates
the money-equivalent premium the tenant receives from a better match with the corresponding
apartment compared to her current apartment, and is drawn from an exogenous distribution. In
the absence of rent control, a tenant accepts any oﬀer with a positive value. Deﬁne the lock-in value
of a tenancy to be the increase in the expected discounted value of quality-adjusted rent a tenant
incurs when she vacates her controlled apartment. Under tenancy rent control, a tenant accepts an
oﬀer only if its value exceeds the lock-in value of the tenancy. The ﬂow deadweight loss resulting
from the tenant’s lock-in is the expected value per unit time of the oﬀers she rejects but would
have accepted in the absence of rent control. Also, when she vacates her controlled apartment, she
essentially transfers the lock-in value to the landlord.
Under tenancy rent control, endogenous tenancy duration further reduces the landlord’s incentive to
maintain. Recognizing that his proﬁt is decreasing in tenancy duration, a landlord has an incentive
to discourage long-term tenancy, and cutting back on maintenance is an eﬀective way to do so23.
In the central model, the commitment-in-maintenance failure arose from the application of tenancy
rent control and the distortion it created was independent of its severity. With endogenous tenancy
duration, however, the more severe is the rent control program, the stronger is the lock-in eﬀect,
and the greater the maintenance distortion under tenancy rent control.
• Separation costs
Now extend the model to take into account that the termination of a tenancy entails separation
costs, for the tenant the monetary and psychic costs of moving24, and for the landlord the cost
of ﬁnding a new tenant. The combination of endogenous tenancy duration and separation costs
alters the landlord-tenant maintenance game. Consider ﬁrst the situation without rent control,
and assume that the market rent function is exogenous so that rent is not a strategy variable. The
22Recent research on rental housing and job mobility in Denmark (Munch and Svarer, 2002, and Svarer, Rosholm,
and Munch, 2005) and the Netherlands (von Ommeren, Rietveld, and Nijkamp, 1999) suggests that the lock-in eﬀect
in those countries substantially reduces not only housing mobility but also job mobility.
23If he pre-speciﬁes a starting rent, the landlord has an incentive to choose a tenant with a low expected tenancy
duration. If he does not pre-specify the starting rent or is willing to oﬀer a discount on the advertised starting rent,
he has an incentive to charge a higher starting rent to applicants with a higher expected tenancy duration.
24See Raess and von Ungern-Sternberg (2002) for the analysis of a hold-up problem that arises when the tenant’s
costs of separation are substantial while the landlord’s costs of ﬁnding a new tenant are negligible.
21landlord can threaten to evict the tenant if she undermaintains, while the tenant can threaten to
vacate her unit if the landlord undermaintains. The magnitude of their separation costs determines
the bargaining power of the two parties. The application of tenancy rent control alters the division
of bargaining power in two ways. First, since tenancy rent control is invariably accompanied by
eviction and conversion restrictions, its application severely restricts landlords’ ability to evict
tenants. Second, when a tenant vacates her unit, its lock-in value is transferred to the landlord,
which increases her separation costs and decreases his. The former eﬀects weakens the landlord’s
bargaining power, the latter strengthens it.
• Long-term tenancy, heterogeneous tenants, and tenancy discounts
In rental housing markets without rent control, it is well documented (e.g., Guasch and Marshall,
1987) that longer-term tenants pay less on average in rent. There is no consensus concerning why
this occurs, but one explanation is that implicit long-term rental contracts contain a feature anal-
ogous to bonus insurance, whereby insurants with good claims records receive premium discounts.
This feature not only rewards good tenants but also provides tenants with an incentive to behave
well, which includes maintaining well. By undermining this feature, the application of tenancy rent
control reduces tenants’ incentive to maintain25.
• Other noncompetitive features of housing markets
The central model assumed the rental housing market to be perfectly competitive in all respects
except for the non-contractibility of landlord maintenance expenditures. Based on there being many
buyers and sellers in the housing market, the assumption that the housing market is perfectly
competitive was standard twenty years ago. But now there is a substantial literature treating
imperfectly competitive aspects of the housing markets. Some of these were treated in the above
discussion, either implicitly or explicitly: the non-contractibility of tenant maintenance, separation
costs, matching frictions, and asymmetric information regarding tenant type. There is a plethora
of other noncompetitive features as well; for example, the heterogeneity of housing units results
in the housing market being monopolistically competitive rather than perfectly competitive, so
that equilibration occurs via both rent and vacancy adjustment (see, for example, Arnott, 1989,
Wheaton, 1990, and Igarashi, 1991). No doubt these other features inﬂuence landlord and tenant
maintenance decisions, but the eﬀects discussed earlier in this subsection would seem to be the
major ones.
• Tenancy rent control is applied to all or part of the market
The model of the paper assumed that tenancy rent control is applied to a single housing unit.
Suppose, at the other extreme, that controls are applied to the entire rental housing market. From
the perspective of the Muthian model of housing services (Muth, 1969), the production ineﬃciency
generated by the commitment failure raises the marginal cost of rental housing services, causing the
equilibrium level of rent per unit of housing service to rise and the equilibrium quantity of housing
25A major cost of being a landlord is dealing with bad tenants, one aspect of which is irresponsibility in mainte-
nance. With the exception of Hubert (1991, 1995), the literature has paid little attention to the ‘bad tenant problem’.
A competitive housing market deals with the bad tenant by not giving her tenancy discounts and by evicting her.
Intuitively, evicting a bad tenant “beggars thy neighbor”, in this case other landlords. The application of tenancy
rent control may therefore counter excessive eviction. But it may also lead to insuﬃcient eviction, and to landlords
exercising statistical discrimination against those groups who are disproportionately bad tenants.
22services consumed to fall, and induces a substitution towards owner-occupied housing26. To extend
the model of this paper to the entire rental housing market requires specifying the spatial context
of the housing market, treating structural density explicitly, and solving for the equilibrium rent
function. Arnott, Davidson, and Pines (1986) presents such a “general equilibrium model” of a
quality continuum of housing in a monocentric city in stationary state. In such models, solving for
the path of adjustment of the housing market to the application of tenancy rent control would be
diﬃcult.
Rent control is often applied to only part of the rental market; for example, in many jurisdictions
new construction is exempt (though sometimes later brought under control). If tenancy rent control
is applied to only part of the rental market, there are not only the general equilibrium eﬀects27
noted above but also complicated sorting eﬀects28.
• Details of the rent control ordinance
Olsen (1988) has argued that most analyses of the eﬀect of rent control on maintenance are over-
simpliﬁed since they fail to take into account the details of the rent control ordinance, as well as
complementary policies. Olsen gives the example of a rent control system with rent level decontrol
and a cost-pass-through provision. Under this system, the landlord may choose to spend more on
maintenance than in the absence of controls since this allows him to raise rents via the cost-pass-
through provision, which permits earlier decontrol. Furthermore, if the government is concerned
about the adverse eﬀects of rent control on maintenance, it may provide more liberal depreciation
under the income tax for capital improvements to rental housing.
Olsen’s criticism applies to our model. We assumed that the time path of rent over a tenancy
is determined according to a simple formula based on the starting rent. But most actual rent
control programs contain other provisions, including cost-pass-through, rate-of-return, and hardship
provisions, that alter the landlord’s incentives to maintain. Landlord’s incentives to maintain are
also aﬀected by taxes, which we ignored.
6.2 Tenancy rent control
We know of no jurisdiction that has imposed tenancy rent control on a previously uncontrolled rental
housing market. Rather, tenancy rent control has been applied as part of a decontrol program from
a previously stricter rent control r´ egime. It has therefore been a political compromise between those
26The application of tenancy rent control would also aﬀect the rental housing market by altering investors’ expec-
tations about the future of rent control.
27There are several papers in the literature that examine the eﬀects of rent control when it is applied to only a
subset of rental housing (e.g., Marks, 1984, and Fallis and Smith, 1984). But all consider ﬁrst- and second-generation
rent control programs, in which the excess demand in the controlled market spills over into the uncontrolled market.
28Suppose, for example, that landlords in the controlled sector are unable to condition the starting rent on tenant
type but are free to discriminate based on tenant type. Tenants who anticipate long tenancies will prefer to live in
controlled housing, but at the same time landlords will want to rent to tenants whom they expect will have short
tenancy durations. We conjecture that these conﬂicting sorting forces lead to a continuum of rational expectations
equilibria, in each of which those tenants with the shortest anticipated tenancy durations choose the uncontrolled
sector in order to avoid front-end-loaded rents while applications from those tenants whose observable characteristics
suggest the longest tenancies are rejected, so that intermediate tenants end up in controlled housing. Other cases,
in which landlords can condition the starting rent on tenant type or are not allowed to discriminate among tenant
types, yield qualitatively diﬀerent sorting patterns.
23who wish for complete decontrol and those who wish the previously stricter r´ egime to be maintained.
This makes it diﬃcult to judge the overall desirability of tenancy rent control. It is unclear not
only what to compare tenancy rent control to – the status quo ante, complete decontrol, or other
decontrol programs – but also how to treat the political constraints that determine the set of feasible
alternative policies.
The evaluation of tenancy rent control is further complicated by disagreement over the appropriate
conceptual standard against which to judge it. If a housing market with tenancy rent control is
judged against the standard of a perfectly competitive housing market, which entails no transactions
costs, symmetric information, and complete insurance markets, among other things, it will be
deemed undesirable. But if it is judged against the standard of a real-world unregulated market,
with all its imperfections, it may fare considerably better. (This theme is developed in Arnott,
1995.)
If a comparison is made between tenancy rent control and alternative, politically feasible methods
of partial decontrol of a previously stricter rent control r´ egime, which would score best most likely
depends on empirical magnitudes, as well as program details. But there are no empirical studies
comparing tenancy rent control with alternative methods of partial decontrol.
Still, some general statements can be made about the pros and cons of tenancy rent control. Ten-
ancy rent control has the advantage that it eliminates the excess demand phenomena associated
with traditional rent control programs. Along with the eviction and conversion restrictions that
invariably accompany it, it also provides sitting tenants with implicit insurance against rent in-
creases that improves security of tenure, which tenants value. It gives preferential treatment to
sitting tenants, who are disproportionately long-term residents, which is inequitable but at the same
time reduces the political opposition to decontrol. Perhaps the most detrimental eﬀect of tradi-
tional rent control programs has been their discouragement of rental housing investment. Whether
moving from a stricter rent control r´ egime to tenancy rent control provides a substantial stimulus
to investment depends on expectations. If landlords are conﬁdent that the movement to tenancy
rent control will soon be followed by complete decontrol, a boom in rental housing investment can
be expected, making up for underinvestment during the years of stricter controls. But landlords
may fear that the next surge in rental housing demand will lead to calls for the reapplication of
harder controls, as happened in Ontario, and postpone investment until the political climate is
more propitious.
6.3 Concluding comments
Tenancy rent control regulates rents within a tenancy, based on the starting rent, but allows the
starting rent to rise without restriction between tenancies. Many jurisdictions around the world
that previously had stricter ﬁrst- and second-generation rent controls programs have introduced
tenancy rent control as a method of partial decontrol.
This paper identiﬁed a previously unnoticed ineﬃciency associated with tenancy rent control, which
we termed the commitment-in-maintenance failure. To simplify the argument, we supposed that
tenancy durations are ﬁxed. The signing of a unit’s lease, which speciﬁes the starting rent, de-
termines the discounted rent over the tenancy. Since the landlord cannot increase the rent he
receives over the tenancy by providing better maintenance, the application of tenancy rent control
eliminates one of the incentives he has to maintain. The other incentive he has, to increase the
quality of the unit at the end of the tenancy, which will increase the rental revenue he receives on
24subsequent tenancies, remains, and encourages maintenance towards the end of the tenancy. Ac-
cording to this line of argument, the application of tenancy rent control leads to the reduction and
postponement of maintenance within a tenancy. A counter-argument is that the landlord is free to
follow the pre-control maintenance program. If the tenant believes that the landlord will do so, she
should be willing to pay the same discounted rent over the tenancy as she would in the absence of
controls, and if she does, tenancy rent control has no adverse eﬀects on maintenance. The crux of
the diﬀerence between the two arguments lies in the ability of a landlord to commit to a mainte-
nance program. We argued that commitment mechanisms in this context are weak, and therefore
that the application of tenancy rent control will indeed lead to the reduction and postponement of
maintenance within a tenancy. We termed the resulting distortion the commitment-in-maintenance
failure of tenancy rent control.
We analyzed the eﬀects of tenancy rent control on the landlord’s maintenance program using
the Arnott-Davidson-Pines ﬁltering model, which regards the housing market as a continuum of
quality submarkets. In order to gauge the magnitude of the distortion due to the commitment-in-
maintenance failure, we developed a calibrated example. Since there has been very little empirical
work based on this conceptualization of the housing market, we can claim only that the parameter
values chosen are reasonable, not realistic. Subject to this caveat, we found the ﬂow deadweight
loss due to the distortion to be about one percent of rent.
Our primary intention in writing this paper was to make a positive contribution to the economic
theory of rent control and more generally to housing economic theory. However, to put the results
in a broader context, at the end of the paper we discussed other channels through which tenancy
rent control aﬀects housing maintenance and commented brieﬂy on the strengths and weaknesses
of tenancy rent control as a method of partial decontrol.
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